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1. Introduction 
 
In Belgium, as in most countries in Western Europe, the most important conditions of employment for the vast 
majority of employees in the private sector are regulated by collective agreements. Nevertheless, the content of 
these collective agreements and the collective bargaining process in Belgium has not yet been the subject of 
much systematic research on the basis of an explicit scientific frame of reference. The study described here 
constitutes a first attempt at making the phenomenon of collective bargaining a subject of academic research. 
Starting with 37 JCs in the private sector, we analysed the content of the collective agreements that were 
negotiated and measured their relevant institutional, organisational and socio-economic characteristics. This 
makes it possible to answer questions such as: to what extent does the dominant level of negotiation (sectoral 
or company level) influence the content of the collective agreement? What effect does the level of organisation 
of trade union federations and employer federations have on the collective agreements negotiated by them? To 
what extent do socio-economic characteristics of the sector for which bargaining is taking place - such as the 
level of competition, sensitivity to exports or the structure of the sector - determine the results of the 
negotiations? This paper makes a start on coming up with answers to all these questions.  
 First of all we present the framework for analysis underlying the research. We then look closely at a 
concept which has occupied a central place in the study: the macro-responsiveness of the collective agreement. 
The hypotheses tested in the study are then formulated. The aims of the study and the research methods used 
are also considered. Finally we present the results of the analysis and draw a number of conclusions from it 
which are also relevant to policymakers. 
 
2. The research model 
 
The research model is represented graphically in figure 1. The aim of the research model is to indicate what 
correlations exist between the content of the collective agreements that are concluded on the one hand and 
relevant aspects of the institutional and socio-economic reality on the other. The arrows in the research model 
point from left to right: the question is to what extent institutions and organisations influence the preferences, 
choices and behaviour of the actors and thereby the outcomes of their interaction and, more specifically, the 
content of the collective agreements that are concluded.1. Although the arrows in the model point from left to 
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 In reality the arrows also point back from right to left. As Visser and Hemerijck (1998) have pointed out, it is possible that the actors, 
on the basis of an evaluation of the effects of their negotiations, will reach a diagnosis of a serious and undesirable failure of policy 
right, the model should not be read in this way, but the other way round: collective agreements come into being 
as a result of negotiations between the (representatives of) the interest organisations involved, and these 
negotiations take place within a specific institutional, organisational and socio-economic context. These actors 
act in a targeted way. We have thus immediately referred to the most important blocks in the research model: 
what needs to be explained is the content of the collective agreement, in this case the agreements concerning 
employment conditions which are (to be) applicable to the employees in a particular sector. The content of 
collective agreements is directly linked to the preferences of the actors who are involved in the negotiations. 
These preferences and the actual behaviour of the actors are, in turn, influenced by the various contexts within 
which they operate: the institutional, organisational and socio-economic context. 
 
Figure 1 A research model for collective bargaining at the meso level 
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On the right-hand side of the research model, which shows the outcomes of the negotiations, we distinguish 
between commitments in collective agreements and their effects. Commitments in collective agreements refer 
to the specific rules which the negotiators involved in collective bargaining have agreed in the collective 
agreement. The commitments in collective agreements are a tangible outcome of collective bargaining. 
Ultimately policymakers are not only concerned with the commitments themselves but also with their effects, 
the 'results on the ground'. What effects do the commitments in collective agreements have on the development 
of wages (moderate or otherwise?), on the flexibility of the labour market and on the organisation of work or 
the development of unemployment and inactivity? In our study we have mainly devoted our attention to the 
content of the commitments in collective agreements and to explaining the differences between sectors in this 
respect. The effects of the collective agreements that have been concluded have not (yet) been researched. That 
                                                                                                                                                                     
and intervene in institutions and/or organisational patterns on the basis of this. Our study does not, however, address this question, 
which relates to the dynamics of institutional reforms. The arrows in question are therefore shaded in the research model. Shaded 
arrows thus indicate correlations that occur in reality and are relevant, but which are not tested in our study. 
is because these effects only become visible a few years after the collective agreements in question have been 
concluded and the socio-economic statistics available at present are not yet sufficiently up-to-date.2. 
 The 'preferences, choices and behaviour of the actors' lie at the heart of our model. Here we are 
explicitly following the 'actor-centered-institutionalism’ approach which is also supported by Visser and 
Hemerijck (1998): the choices underlying what is done by the actors are not only made due to rational cost-
benefit considerations but they are equally determined by normative orientations, preferences, aims, means of 
exerting force, interests, collective identities and cognitive capacities of the actors. Socio-cultural processes 
also have a part to play in creating the actors' preferences (see also Hemerijck, 1994, p. 236-237; Crouch, 
1982, pp. 38-41). In our model, preferences are associated with cognitive processes and also with culturally 
and ideologically determined norm and value complexes, as well as the weighing up of interests based on a 
specific position.3.  
Otherwise we do not agree with the neo-classical and neo-institutional theory that actors engaged in 
targeted, rational action only strive strictly towards their own interests. As in the case of institutionalism, we 
expressly leave open the possibility that actors take into account the interests of others and the impact of their 
actions on 'general welfare'. However, and here we come to the heart of our message, actors will only be 
willing under specific institutional and organisational conditions to help to resolve social problems that go 
beyond their own immediate and strict self-interest. In other words: the preferences of the actors and how they 
prioritise those preferences are partly influenced by the specific circumstances in which their interventions take 
place. How the actors ultimately behave is based not only on their choices in relation to the relevant 
preferences but also on institutional, organisational and socio-economic factors. These are the factors and 
contexts which have been included with some emphasis in our research model. 
In the first place our research model makes it possible to investigate the correlation between 
characteristics of institutions and preferences of negotiators involved in collective bargaining. By institutions 
we mean the written and unwritten rules relating to collective bargaining in Belgium. Many of the written rules 
that apply to collective bargaining have been defined by law and consequently apply to all sectors. Hence the 
law has defined an important 'institute' for collective bargaining covering (parts of) sectors, namely the JC. The 
effect of legally defined rules, for example the conditions under which collective agreements can be declared 
generally binding and the monopoly on representation in collective bargaining, is not a subject for 
consideration in this type of study - a comparison between sectoral collective agreements in a single country. 
That is because these rules do not differ between the JCs. In addition to the written rules, however, there are 
also a large number of unwritten rules governing collective bargaining. Not everything is or can be prescribed 
by law and consequently the social partners themselves also have to regulate the relationships between them. 
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 As we will see below, we have analysed the content of the collective agreements which were negotiated in the JCs selected by us 
according to the extent to which they contain commitments to promote employment. Unfortunately it is not yet possible to measure the 
effect of these on the development of employment. The most recent employment statistics date from 2000, and we have produced an 
inventory of the content of commitments in collective agreements which were in force in early 1999. If commitments in collective 
agreements have an effect on employment, it can only be measured over a number of years. 
3
 Preferences indicate what people consider to be valuable and worth striving for, taking into account their own position in the 
structure of networks of interaction and the interests that can be derived from this, and in view of their awareness of the effect of 
interventions as a result of striving towards preferences. 
What is more, our research has shown that the various JCs handle the legal rules in different ways. Over time 
more or less specific negotiating practices emerge in the JCs. This phenomenon points to the fact that the 
actors always enjoy some room for manoeuvre and freedom of interpretation in relation to what seem to be 
compulsory institutions4. The 'weight' of the collective agreements concluded at the sectoral level, whether 
they contain substantial commitments or only minimum commitments which have to be worked out and 
supplemented later at the company level, is not formally prescribed anywhere. The dominant level at which 
negotiation takes place, namely the sectoral or the company level, is therefore the result of commitments and 
arrangements which have come about on the basis of years of experience of the practical realities of collective 
bargaining in a particular sector. In our study we will mainly pay attention to (unwritten) rules of this kind 
concerning collective bargaining: these do differ between JCs and their institutional effect is therefore 
measurable. In particular we will study the influence of the dominant level of negotiation.  
Unlike Van den Toren (1996) we have made a distinction in our research model between 
characteristics of institutions and characteristics of organisations. That is because we wish to be open from the 
outset to the possibility that institutions and organisations operating within this organisational context will act 
independently of each other to influence the preferences, choices and behaviour of the actors. We also consider 
that in many studies little or insufficient attention is paid to the characteristics of interest organisations.5. 
Usually the analysis is limited to the institutional context and pays no explicit attention to the characteristics of 
the organisations acting within it. In our research model we specifically pay attention to the characteristics of 
interest organisations: how many members they have, how they create loyalty among their members, the 
means of exerting influence that are available to the organisation, the extent to which internal co-ordination 
takes place and the direct involvement of the members in making decisions.  
Our research model also provides for the possibility of interaction effects arising between the 
characteristics of institutions and organisations. This is shown in figure 1 by the arrow between the 
'preferences, choices and behaviour of the actors' block and the link between the 'institutions' and 
'organisations' blocks. It is conceivable, for example, that highly centralised collective bargaining only gives 
rise to a certain institutional effect when it is carried out by a highly organised employer federation and not 
with a low or moderate level of organisation in the employer federation. Another possible interaction effect 
exists between the degree of centralisation and the level of unionisation (see also Paloheimo, 1990).  
Finally our research model makes it possible to analyse the influence of factors from the technological 
and socio-economic context within which negotiators operate in sectoral collective bargaining. In particular we 
have measured a few relevant characteristics of sector-related technological and economic environment in our 
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 For example, the social partners themselves determine who conducts the actual collective negotiations: while the law assumes that all 
the organisations represented on the JC will take part in the negotiations, certain organisations do not take part in the actual 
negotiations preceding the conclusion of an agreement. 
5
 In this connection we define interest organisations as those organisations that take part in collective bargaining at the sectoral level on 
behalf of their members. In Belgium the organisations that support the interests of employers in the sector and represent them during 
collective bargaining are generally referred to by the term 'employer federations'. Usually - but not always - these employer federations are 
members of the umbrella organisation for employer organisations, the Verbond van Belgische Ondernemingen (VBO). The organisations 
which support the interests of employees in the sector and represent them in collective bargaining are usually referred to as 'trade union 
federations' or 'trade unions' . All recognised trade union federations or trade unions are affiliated to one of the three umbrella trade unions 
or trade union confederations: the Christian ACV, the socialist ABVV and the liberal ACLVB.  
model, such as the level of competition in the market, the export-orientation of the sector, the corporate 
structure of the sector and the development of employment within the sector. We have already indicated above 
that the preferences of the actors and the priority that is given to preferences is partly determined by specific 
circumstances. It is therefore possible, for example, that a drastic decline in the level of employment in the 
sector will lead to higher priority being given to 'promoting employment' and a lower priority to 'improving 
pay'. Negotiators involved in collective bargaining will therefore tend to make more commitments in collective 
agreements on promoting employment. Like the institutional and organisational context, the technological and 
economic environment also influences the preferences, choices and behaviours of the actors and therefore the 
outcomes of the negotiations. That influence, however, is by no means decisive or determinative. Consequently 
there is no arrow from the environment block to the commitments in collective agreements block. 
 
3. The macro-responsiveness of the collective agreement 
 
The content of collective agreements can be studied from various different perspectives. Hence one might ask 
what influence commitments in collective agreements have on the cost of labour: to what extent does the 
collective agreement result in more or less moderate growth in pay or to wages rising out of control? Another 
relevant perspective looks at the flexibility of the labour market and the organisation of work: to what extent 
do commitments in collective agreements lead to greater flexibility or greater rigidity in the labour market and 
in the organisation of work?  
In this study we have chosen yet another perspective on the content of the collective agreement. The 
social partners are generally presented as (corporatist) organisations which are purely oriented towards 
defending and supporting the interests of their members and their own interests as an organisation. Following 
on from the corporatist and institutionalist theories, however, we do not exclude the possibility that the 
negotiators involved in collective bargaining may also be oriented towards the wider society and specific social 
problems. It is precisely because they have learned from experience that their negotiations have a major impact 
beyond the limits of their own sector or business, that they may possibly develop a certain sense of social 
responsibility and explicitly or implicitly take into account the consequences of their interventions on wider 
segments of society.  
Following Van den Toren (1996) we have used the concept of 'macro-responsiveness' in our analysis.  
Van den Toren describes this as: the extent to which and the way in which social effects and aims are 
incorporated in the collective agreement. We will set out a more operational definition of this concept below. 
Macro-responsiveness, then, refers to the extent to which negotiators involved in collective bargaining 
approach the collective agreement as a tool to make contributions towards resolving social problems and 
questions. Examples of social questions are pushing down unemployment, promoting participation by women 
in work and the integration of ethnic groups in society. The question is then whether commitments are made or 
                                                                                                                                                                     
 
practical measures are introduced in the collective agreement to make a targeted contribution towards resolving 
the social question concerned.  
The macro-responsiveness of the collective agreement is the dependent variable in our study. We have 
also operationalised that dependant variable in a specific and limitative way. We have decided to select a well-
defined and specific social problem and research the extent to which negotiators involved in collective 
bargaining take steps in sectoral collective agreements to help to resolve the problem. The social problem 
selected by us is unemployment, or, more broadly: inactivity. The question is to what extent commitments are 
made in sectoral collective agreements concerning measures intended to push down unemployment and/or to 
promote the creation of new jobs. The choice of unemployment as a social problem was mainly informed by 
the fact that unemployment was stable at a high level for most of the 1990s - after a rise from 1993 onwards 
(Van Ruysseveldt, 2002, p. 8-26) and is defined by the various actors involved in making policy - both various 
public authorities and the social partners - as highly problematic (Van Ruysseveldt, 2000, pp. 136-139). In our 
study we observed that little attention was, in fact, devoted during sectoral collective bargaining to promoting 
employment, and it would be justified to conclude that the macro-responsiveness of collective agreements in 
Belgium, and therefore the social orientation of the sectoral negotiators involved in collective bargaining, is 
rather poor. In fact we observed that there are major differences between the 37 JCs involved in our study in 
terms of the way in which measures are incorporated in the collective agreement to promote employment (see 
Van Ruysseveldt, 2000, pp. 273-275). The question that then arises is: how can these differences in the content 
of collective agreements be explained? In the following section we have set out a number of hypotheses in this 
connection. First we will briefly consider the way in which we measured the dependent variable in practice.6. 
 
Figure 2 Employment measures in collective agreements 
Supply orientation Demand orientation 
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The measurement of the dependent variable is based on a content analysis of all stipulations in collective 
agreements which were in force in June 1999 for the JCs included in our study. That means that the 
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 For a more detailed description of the methods used to measure the dependent variable, see Van Ruysseveldt, 2000, pp. 254-272. 
stipulations resulting from collective bargaining during the 1999-2000 period were not included, but all the 
stipulations that were in force until June 1999 were included. In summary, the measures in the collective 
agreement to promote employment or push down unemployment were measured and weighted. This was done 
on the basis of the following principles. First of all it was necessary to measure the extent to which collective 
bargaining at the JC level gave rise to additional commitments. In a number of cases the texts of sectoral 
collective agreements repeat what has already been determined by law or on an interprofessional basis. They 
do not, therefore, create any extra or additional rights, commitments or opportunities. The measuring tool had 
to be designed in such a way that the score that was given only records the extra achievements at the level of 
the JC. Figure 2 summarises the subjects on which sectoral negotiators involved in collective bargaining can 
make commitments. Secondly the measuring instrument that was developed not only had to 'count' the number 
of employment promotion measures negotiated at the sectoral level, but it also had to be capable of expressing 
the scope of those measures in a numerical way. In other words: it was necessary not only to count them 
mechanically, but also to use qualitative weighting. A particular commitment - for example concerning the 
promotion of voluntary part-time work - appears in a number of collective agreements, but in one collective 
agreement a far-reaching scheme has been developed while in another there is virtually nothing more than a 
mention of the measure. The measuring tool must express differences of this kind in the quality or 'weighting' 
of the commitment that has been negotiated in numerical terms. The following method should be used: the 
more enforceable rights the commitment creates for those involved, and the more and stronger incentives 
provided by the commitment to make choices that will have a favourable impact on employment, the greater 
the weighting and thus the larger the number assigned to the commitment7. In this way a score was calculated 
for each of the 37 JCs which reveals the extent to which measures have been taken to promote employment. 
That score also offers an indication of the level of macro-responsiveness of the collective agreement. 
 
4. The macro-responsiveness of the collective agreement: hypotheses 
 
Why are the collective agreements negotiated in some JCs more macro-responsive than those negotiated in 
others? How can differences between JCs be explained on the basis of the level of macro-responsiveness of 
their collective agreements? In this section we will set out a few hypotheses which have been tested in our 
study.  
 
Hypothesis 1: As the negotiators involved in collective bargaining speak out more clearly in favour of 
making contributions towards solutions to wider social questions, the macro-
responsiveness of the collective agreement increases. 
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 Here is an example: sector-specific commitments providing additional payments for a person taking a career break in the case of a 
part-time career break so that the loss of income is limited, and which offer guidance and financial support to the employer when 
looking for and training a temporary replacement, score more highly than commitments in which these types of incentives and support 
are not present. 
In line with the theoretical starting points of our research model ('actor-centered institutionalism') we are 
assuming that there is a link between the preferences of the actors and the content of the collective agreement. 
The commitments made in the collective agreement partly reflect the preferences of the actors and the priority 
that they assign to each of those preferences, given specific circumstances. As actors become more socially 
oriented, have a greater preference for making contributions towards general welfare or bringing practical 
solutions to social problems which are defined as undesirable and therefore make these a higher priority, the 
collective agreement will take on a more pronounced macro-responsive character.  
Now we do not want to fall into naïve voluntarism,: the content of the collective agreement is not only 
the result of an exchange between actors with specific preferences to which specific priorities are allocated, 
independently of the context in which the negotiations take place. With regard to the content of the collective 
agreement it is not only important what the negotiators want to do, but also what they can do. Institutional and 
organisational characteristics have a part to play here. The essence of our argument is therefore that negotiators 
involved in collective bargaining are only willing and able under specific institutional and organisational 
conditions to contribute towards solutions to problems that go beyond their own immediate self-interest.  
 
Hypothesis 2: As more substantial commitments on employment conditions are agreed in the sectoral 
collective agreement and collective bargaining therefore becomes more centralised, the 
macro-responsiveness of the collective agreement increases. 
 
Based on the following theoretical argument it can be assumed that as sectoral collective bargaining takes 
place in a more centralised way, the chance of a macro-responsive collective agreement increases. This 
theoretical argument concerns the production of collective goods and the problems of collective action which 
are associated with this. Collective agreements often create collective goods. Collective goods are goods (or 
services) which have to be produced collectively. As soon as they are produced, however, no-one can be 
excluded from the enjoyment of them. Once they have been provided to a single individual, they are also 
available to others at no extra cost. If no-one can be excluded from enjoyment of a good and if everyone 
cannot be obliged to contribute towards the cost of production of the same good, a sub-optimal situation arises 
where the production of the collective good lags behind or fails to grow. From the perspective of the individual 
it is in his own strict self-interest not to contribute towards the costs of production of a collective good: the 
individual's contribution towards the production of a collective good is not really necessary as long as the 
others do it, and after all one cannot be excluded from the enjoyment of it. If everyone follows this reasoning 
then the collective good is not produced. When it comes to optimising the production of collective goods it is 
therefore necessary to prevent freeloading behaviour: if everyone is able to benefit from a good, then everyone 
must also pay a share towards creating it. 
 Collective agreements that contribute towards the resolution of social problems can very well be seen 
as examples of collective goods. The effective solution of social problems benefits the whole of society. If, for 
example, commitments are made in the collective agreement to push down unemployment, then it is primarily 
the unemployed people themselves who will benefit. Employers, employees and the government will, 
however, also be better off: if unemployment falls then less unemployment benefit needs to be paid out and the 
parafiscal pressure can be reduced or the resources which are released can be used in other areas of social 
security. If everyone benefits from a reduction in unemployment, how is it possible to ensure that everyone 
also contributes towards the costs of measures to promote employment?  
This problem of collective action also arises for negotiators involved in collective bargaining at the 
sectoral level. The question arises here of whether all companies in the sector contribute equally towards the 
costs of collective goods which are created by a collective agreement. If sectoral training provision has been 
introduced under a collective agreement and the associated costs are borne only by the members of the 
employer federation that has signed the collective agreement, while all employers are able to benefit from the 
increased level of training of employees, a competitive disadvantage will result for the members of the 
employer federations: they are paying for the costs but others can enjoy the benefits of the training provision 
free of charge.
8
. Now freeloading at the sectoral level can be prevented by negotiating inclusive collective 
agreements, i.e.: collective agreements that apply to all companies and all employees in the sector. Collective 
agreements have a more inclusive character when they are negotiated at a more central level (because they then 
apply to all employers who are affiliated to the employer federations that sign them) and when the sectoral 
collective agreement is declared generally binding (since the collective agreement then applies to all employers 
in the sector, including those which are not organised). In other words the aim is to achieve the highest 
possible level of coverage, either by bringing about the highest possible level of organisation (on the employer 
side) or by calling for support from the government. As collective bargaining takes on a less inclusive 
character, the production of collective goods under collective agreements will become more problematic. If 
negotiations take place exclusively at the level of enterprises, there is a greater likelihood that the production of 
collective goods will lag behind. 
 In the Belgian market sector, sectoral collective agreements are almost always concluded and these 
sectoral collective agreements are in almost all cases declared to be generally binding. The level of coverage of 
collective agreements in the sectors of the Belgian economy is 100%, almost without exception. Nevertheless 
there are differences between the sectors, depending on the degree of centralisation of collective bargaining. 
Two aspects are important here: to what extent does negotiation also take place at the company level and how 
are sectoral collective agreements and company collective agreements interrelated? In this way a distinction 
can be made between sectors in which negotiations take place exclusively or predominantly at the sectoral 
level and sectors in which negotiations sometimes take place at the company level. In the latter case a 
distinction also needs to be made between sectors in which the sectoral collective agreement contains many 
substantial commitments on employment conditions and sectors in which the sectoral collective agreement 
only contains minimum commitments and the actual substantial benefits are negotiated in the collective 
agreements concluded for larger companies. In the latter sectors the collective bargaining process is least 
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 In principle it then makes sense for individual employers no longer to be members of the employer federation, since in this way they 
can save the costs while still benefiting from the results. If all employers reasoned in this way, the employer federation and the 
training provision would disappear and the production of collective goods would lag behind. 
centralised. As more substantial commitments on employment conditions are made in the sectoral collective 
agreements, the collective bargaining in our model takes on a more centralised character.  
 
As we have stated earlier, the content of the collective agreement partly reflects the preferences, priorities and 
aspirations of the organisations involved in collective bargaining. Even more than studying what the 
negotiating parties are striving to achieve, it is important to research which of the negotiating parties' 
aspirations they are able to realise. Parties want to achieve a lot, but what can they actually bring about? How 
do they succeed in asserting their preferences in negotiations with the other parties and ensuring that 
commitments are included in the collective agreement which (partly) correspond to their preferences, even 
against the will of the other parties? Negotiation is, in essence, a process of exchange between parties with 
divergent interests, ambitions, wishes, expectations, preferences and priorities. The extent to which parties 
succeed in pushing through their wishes depends partly on the means of exerting power that they are able to 
mobilise and deploy and the means of exerting power that the other parties are able to mobilise and deploy. To 
gain a clear view of the way in which commitments are included in collective agreements, it is therefore 
necessary to consider not only at the preferences and priorities of the parties involved but also the means of 
exerting power that are available.  
 
Hypothesis 3: As trade union federations which have a clear preference in favour of contributing 
towards the resolution of social questions achieve a higher level of organisation, the 
macro-responsiveness of the collective agreement increases. 
 
In most studies the power of the trade unions is exclusively or mainly measured on the basis of the level of 
organisation9. The level of organisation or unionisation is indeed one of the most decisive measures of the 
power of trade unions. Two important aspects of trade union power are closely linked to it: First of all the 
operating resources that trade unions obtain from membership contributions and which can, for example, be 
used to develop professional staff or build a strike fund. Secondly the potential for mobilisation if the other 
parties - employers or the government - have to be put under pressure.  
For employer organisations the same reasoning applies in theory as for the trade unions. The more 
means of exerting power employer organisations have at their disposal and the higher their level of 
organisation, the more successful they will be at putting forward their preferences and priorities in collective 
bargaining and achieving their aims. In sectors where employer federations have a clear social orientation and 
have achieved a high level of organisation, the likelihood of finding macro-responsive collective bargaining is 
higher than in other sectors10.  
 There is also another argument that plays a part in relation to the level of organisation on the 
employer side. Since most collective agreements are declared to be generally binding, the level of coverage in 
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 In the study the power of trade unions is also measured in a more comprehensive and complex way. On this subject see Van 
Ruysseveldt (2000), pp. 155-158. Using the multi-dimensional indicator of the trade unions' power, however, gives the same result as 
using the level of unionisation. We will therefore not be looking in detail at the multi-dimensional indicator here. 
the Belgian market sector is usually 100%. If there is no generally binding declaration then the level of 
coverage corresponds to the level of organisation on the employer side: since in that case all the employees 
who work for organised employers will be covered by the collective agreement. As the level of organisation on 
the employer side becomes higher, the level of coverage in the absence of a generally binding declaration is 
also higher. The level of organisation of employers is thus an indication of the extent to which problems with 
collective action (freeloading) can be resolved within a sector if there were no generally binding declaration. In 
sectors with a high level of organisation on the employer side a high level of coverage would still be achieved, 
problems of collective action could be addressed more easily and more macro-responsive collective bargaining 
would be possible than in sectors with a low level of organisation among employers. 
 
Hypothesis 4:  A high level of organisation on the employer side promotes macro-responsiveness in 
collective bargaining. 
 
The hypotheses which we have set out above focus on the correlation between one factor (or sometimes two 
factors) from our research model and the dependent variable: the macro-responsiveness of the collective 
agreement. Our model, however, also provides for the possibility that interaction effects will arise between 
institutional and organisational variables. We are particularly interested in the interaction effect between the 
dominant level at which bargaining takes place and the power of the interest organisations taking part in the 
negotiations. Hence Scharpf emphasises the joint importance of these two factors: “the strength and the 
organizational structure of its labor unions and (…) the effective locus of collective bargaining" (Scharpf, 
1984, p. 275). Our hypothesis is then as follows:  
 
Hypothesis 5: The macro-responsiveness of the collective agreement is highest where collective 
bargaining is centralised and interest organisations are also highly organised. 
 
The macro-responsiveness of the collective agreement is operationalised in this study as the occurrence of 
commitments in collective agreements to promote employment. We have therefore investigated the extent to 
which the following socio-economic environmental characteristics have an influence: the level of competition 
in the sector, market orientation and developments in the sectoral labour market.  
 
Hypothesis 6: As competition in the market increases, the macro-responsiveness of the collective 
agreement declines. 
 
We are assuming that the inclusion of measures in the collective agreement to promote employment always 
entails certain costs. If those costs are taken from the room available for pay increases, the cost effect of 
measures to promote unemployment remains neutral for employers. As the available scope for pay increases 
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 For a more detailed theoretical outworking of this argument we refer to Van Ruysseveldt (2000), pp. 158-159. 
becomes smaller, however, employees will be less willing to sacrifice part of it in order to promote 
employment. They will, in any case, have a tendency to demand, on the basis of the norm of reciprocity (see 
Putnam, 1993) that employees should also contribute towards the effort to promote employment and should 
therefore accept a proportion of the costs. The scope for negotiation at the sectoral level is partly determined 
by the level of competition in the market. At high levels of competition the available scope for negotiation 
shrinks and there will be less willingness among the negotiating parties to pay a lot of attention to contributions 
towards the resolution of wider social problems.  
 
Hypothesis 7: As a sector is oriented more towards the international market and less towards the 
domestic market, the macro-responsiveness of the collective agreement declines. 
 
A variant on hypothesis 6 concerns the dominant market orientation in the sector. In some sectors companies 
produce primarily for the domestic market and in others they produce mainly for the international market. It is 
not true that production for domestic markets necessarily means less competition than production for 
international markets. In sectors that produce for the domestic market, however, it is possible to remove pay 
and employment conditions from the scope of competition by concluding sectoral collective agreements 
(which are declared generally binding). In that case it can be assumed that the willingness to make 
commitments in collective agreements in relation to specific social problems will increase, even through there 
are costs associated with them, since all companies are obliged to contribute towards those costs. Companies 
cannot derive a competitive advantage from this area because they are all obliged to comply with and 
implement the stipulations of the collective agreement. That is not the case for companies in sectors producing 
for the international market. They are in competition with companies from other countries. In a number of 
countries companies will not be bound to sectoral collective agreements and the trade union movement in those 
countries and companies may be so weak that they offer no serious serious counterweight to the employers. In 
other words: from an international perspective a distinction must be made between companies in the organised 
sector which are obliged to negotiate with strong trade unions and companies in the non-organised sector 
which are not or far less strongly bound to collective agreements and to negotiations with trade unions. 
Companies in the latter group can derive a competitive advantage from this. The result may be that collective 
agreements concluded for companies and sectors in countries with strong trade unions are less substantial 
because the negotiators are aware of the effect of excessively 'expensive' collective agreements on the market 
share of the organised companies and sectors. Due to the dynamics of international competition, a remarkable 
situation can arise within a single country: although sectoral collective agreements are negotiated in all sectors 
and the trade union movement is strongly organised, the collective agreements negotiated in sectors that 
produce for the domestic market will leave more scope and pay more attention to socially relevant issues than 
the collective agreements negotiated in sectors producing for the international market.  
 
 
5. Structure of the study and research methods 
 
A database has been created in the context of this study. The database includes about 700 variables for 37 JCs 
from 17 economic sectors. A small proportion of this data is derived from government statistics on employment, 
pay and working hours. The vast majority of the data is collected on the basis of structured verbal interviews 
with negotiators involved in collective bargaining from the (largest) employer federation involved and the 
(largest) ACV trade union federation involved. Finally a large amount of information was gathered on the 
content of the collective agreements concluded in the JCs in question. A content analysis was therefore carried 
out. Here we will briefly consider the various methods of data collection11. 
 
5.1 Population and sample 
The research units in our study are Joint Committees abbreviated to: JCs. These are negotiating bodies set up by 
law in which the relevant employer federation(s) and the relevant trade union federations from the recognised 
trade union confederations (ACV, ABVV and ACLVB) can conclude collective agreements determining the 
most important pay and employment conditions for the employees in the sector for which the JC is competent. 
JCs are therefore always competent in a specific sector, such as the metal industry, printing presses, hotels, 
restaurants and cafés or road transport12.  
 JCs are the research units in our study. It is helpful, however, to remember that these are not ordinary 
respondents. Specifically, JCs cannot be interviewed. Information about their characteristics has to be obtained 
indirectly, either by consulting secondary source material (for example government statistics or minutes of the 
meetings of JCs), or by asking for information from privileged witnesses. In our study the privileged witnesses 
are the spokespeople who conduct the collective bargaining in a JC on behalf of their organisations. For each JC 
a structured verbal interview (see below) was conducted with the spokesperson for the largest employer 
federation, usually affiliated to the VBO, and the spokesperson for the largest ACV trade union federation. The 
key characteristics of JCs have been derived from their responses to the questions on the questionnaire.  
Before sampling the JCs that were to be investigated, the population was defined in greater detail. A 
total of three restrictions were imposed upon the population. First of all the population was restricted to industry 
and services. Secondly the population was restricted to operational JCs with at least 1,000 employees in their 
area of competence. The third restriction was more technical. A large number of white-collar employees in 
diverse sectors for which an individual JC has not been formed fall within JC 218 (the Supplementary National 
Joint Committee for White-collar Employees, [Dutch:] ANPCB). As a result the composition of JC 218 is very 
heterogeneous. For this reason it cannot be researched in the same way as the other JCs which are involved in 
our study. From the population defined in this way, a sample of economic sectors was taken (by NACE code). 
The JCs that negotiate for the NACE sectors that were drawn were then identified.  
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 For detailed notes on the structure of the study and the methods of data collection that were used: see Van Ruysseveldt (2000), pp. 
167-184. 
12
 Sometimes a JC is only competent for the blue-collar workers in the sector, sometimes only for the white-collar employees in the 
sector and sometimes for both. In a number of sectors there are also Joint subCommittees alongside the JCs, abbreviated to: JsCs. JsCs 
 Table 1  Sample: sectors according to the NACE-bel company classification and  
number and name of the associated JCs. 
sector nr. name of NACE sector nr. JC name of JC  
15 Food industry 118 food industry - blue-collar workers 
  220 food industry - white-collar employees 
17 Textiles 120 textiles industry - blue-collar workers  
  214 textiles industry - white-collar employees  
18 Clothing 109 blue-collar workers in the clothing and finishing 
industry 
  215 white-collar employees in clothing and 
finishing etc. 
21 Paper and cardboard 129 blue-collar workers in paper and cardboard 
production 
  221 white-collar employees in paper and cardboard 
production 
  136 blue-collar workers in paper and cardboard 
processing 
  222 white-collar employees in paper and cardboard 
processing 
22 Graphical industry 130.01 blue-collar workers in the printing industry  
23 Oil industry 117 blue-collar workers - oil industry  
  127 blue-collar workers - fuel trading 
  211 white-collar employees - oil industry  
24+25 Chemical industry 116 blue-collar workers - chemical industry 
  207 white-collar employees - chemical industry 
27 Steel and  104 blue-collar workers in iron industry 
 non-ferrous 210 white-collar employees in iron and steel 
industry 
  105 blue-collar workers - non-ferrous  
  224 white-collar employees - non-ferrous 
28-35 Metalworking 111.01&02 blue-collar workers - metalworking 
  209 white-collar employees - metalworking 
40 Energy 326 gas and electricity generation 
45 Construction 124 blue-collar workers - construction 
  149.01 electricians 
50 Garages 112 blue-collar workers - garages 
  149.02 blue-collar workers - bodywork 
52 Retail 119 blue-collar workers - trading in food products 
  201 white-collar employees - independent retail 
  202 white-collar employees - food retail 
  311 large retail businesses 
  312 department stores 
55 Hotels, restaurants and cafés 302 hotels, restaurants, cafés 
60 Transport 140.04 blue-collar workers - goods transport 
65 Banks 310 banks 
66 Insurance 306 insurers 
  307 brokers and insurance agents 
 
                                                                                                                                                                     
are only competent for a part of the sector, for example JsC 149.2 is only competent for bodywork companies (and not for garage 
companies). 
Table 1 shows the 17 sectors and the associated 37 JCs that were involved in the study. In total this sample 
comprises 67% of the JCs in the market sector which negotiate for more than 1000 employees and are 
operational: 71% of the JCs in industry and 60% of JCs in services are included in the study. If we take the level 
of employment as a starting-point when determining the representativeness of the sample, we also obtain a 
positive result: the JCs involved in the study collectively negotiate for 80% of the jobs in the market economy. In 
service sectors, the representativeness in terms of employment is rather lower than in the industrial sectors: the 
JCs in our study negotiate for 90% of the employees in industry and 70% of the employees in services. 
 
5.2 Method of data collection 
Due to the fact that sectoral collective bargaining in Belgium has not yet been much studied and little systematic 
information has been gathered on the procedure and results of collective bargaining, the study was divided into 
stages. Several different methods of data collection were also used: both qualitative and quantitative research. In 
a first stage, characterised by the use of qualitative research techniques, an extensive exploration of the field was 
carried out.13. The priority aim of this research stage was to outline collective bargaining at the sectoral level in 
the market sector and to gain a reliable picture of the population. In a second stage the data included in the 
database is then collected in a structured way.  
Of the 37 JCs included in our study, the spokesperson for the (most important) employer federation and 
the spokesperson for the largest ACV federation were always approached for a verbal interview.14. The response 
was - unexpectedly - high15. It was decided to use a structured questionnaire with a majority of closed questions. 
The data is easily comparable between JCs and allows good (quantitative) measurement of the key variables. 
Since the questionnaire was completed verbally, there was also scope - if necessary - to go into more detail about 
the specific situation in a particular JC. In parallel with this research stage statistics on the labour market, wages 
and working hours were also collected and added to the database. Finally a content analysis was carried out for 
the collective agreements concluded in the selected JCs (see Van Ruysseveldt, 2000, pp. 180-183 and 253-275). 
 
6. Research results: the incidence of employment measures in the collective agreement explained 
 
In this section we present the results of the empirical analysis of the database for the 37 selected JCs. Here we 
have used a variety of different analysis techniques: correlation coefficients, covariance analysis and multiple 
regression analysis. We successively test the various hypotheses that were set out in section 4. 
 
                                                        
13
 For a description of the first stage of the study we refer to Van Ruysseveldt, 2000, pp. 178-180. 
14
 In the event that the white-collar federations take the lead in the JC, the spokesperson of LBC, the Dutch Christian white-collar 
employee federation, was always approached rather than the spokesperson of CNE, the French-speaking Christian white-collar 
employee federation. 
15
 On the side of the ACV federations involved, only the involvement of the spokesperson in PC 104 Steel industry gave rise to a 
(linguistic) problem. On the employer federation side only the representative of the Federatie van Belgische Transporteurs refused to 
co-operate. 
6.1 Preferences of negotiators involved in collective bargaining on behalf of ACV trade union federations 
Is there a link between the preferences of negotiators involved in collective bargaining and the results of 
negotiations? We will limit ourselves here to the preferences of the ACV negotiators in relation to employment 
promotion. Measurement of the variable 'preferences of ACV negotiators' deserves some explanation. The 
actual negotiations are conducted by the spokespersons of the interest organisations taking part in collective 
bargaining (see Van Ruysseveldt, 2000, pp. 185-219). They are the ones who make the demands and 
preferences of their organisation explicit to the other negotiators involved in collective bargaining. Of course 
these spokespersons are negotiating not in their own name, but on behalf of their organisations. The militants 
in the trade union federations are consulted extensively to draw up the programme of demands and also during 
the negotiations. These internal negotiations should determine the attitude of the collective bargaining 
negotiator in question both before and during the negotiations. Since the opinions of the militants differ, 
however, and the interests of those in the organisation are not as homogeneous as is often assumed, the 
negotiator involved in collective bargaining does, of course, have some scope to put forward demands and 
determine emphases in the collective agreement which is negotiated. What we are therefore seeking to measure 
is the way in which the negotiator involved in collective bargaining perceives the demands from the 
organisation and makes use of the available room for manoeuvre. We presented the three statements set out 
below to the negotiator involved in collective bargaining and the answers were scored on a five-point scale 
(completely agree, completely disagree): 
1. 'If a choice has to be made, the employees covered by my JC would prefer commitments in the collective 
agreement to improve pay rather than commitments to promote employment'. 
2. 'The employees covered by my JC are very concerned to achieve an improvement in employment, even if 
it requires measures to be introduced at the expense of an improvement in pay'. 
3. 'Is your organisation willing, in your opinion, to use a proportion of the available scope for pay increases 
to promote employment?'. 
The person being questioned is therefore always faced with a dilemma. Of course everyone wants to promote 
employment. Preferences only become clear, however, and differences between negotiators involved in 
collective bargaining become sharper, when asking whether they are willing to sacrifice part of the pay 
increase for it. The questions therefore do not ask for the views or preferences of the negotiator involved in 
collective bargaining himself but for his perception of the views and preferences of his organisation. We are 
assuming here that as the negotiator involved in collective bargaining makes it known that his organisation is 
willing, to a certain extent, to give up pay in exchange for initiatives to promote employment, he will have a 
greater tendency to promote measures in favour of employment at the negotiating table. 
 A covariance analysis was carried out with 'preference of the ACV negotiator in relation to 
employment' as an independent variable and 'evolution of employment 1992-1997' and 'average size of 
compkany' as covariates. The measurements showed that 'preference of the ACV negotiator in relation to 
employment' had a significant main effect on the dependent variable 'employment measures in the collective 
agreement'': F(2.32) = 3.48 (p<.05). 
 We also investigated whether an interaction effect arises between the influence that an organisation is 
able to exercise on the collective bargaining process and its preferences in relation to the result of the 
negotiations. Those who are stronger are able to be better or realise their wishes when interacting with actors 
who are less strong. A covariance analysis was carried out with the interaction between 'preference of the ACV 
negotiator in relation to employment' and 'level of organisation of employees' as independent variables and 
'evolution of employment 1992-1997', 'average company size' and 'degree of centralisation of collective 
bargaining' as covariates. A significant interaction effect was found between 'preference of the ACV negotiator 
in relation to employment' and 'level of organisation of employees' measured according to the dependent 
variable 'employment measures in the collective agreement': F(3.30) = 8.03 (p<.01). It is therefore the JCs in 
which trade union federations are strong players and ACV negotiators also have a high preference for 
promoting employment that score highly for 'employment in the collective agreement'.  
 
6.2 Centralisation of collective bargaining and employment measures in the collective agreement 
Is there a link between the dominant level of collective bargaining and employment measures in the collective 
agreement? The promotion of employment by social partners at the sectoral or company level raises problems 
of collective action. This is because everyone has an interest in promoting employment, and a problem of 
freeloading arises if everyone cannot be obliged to contribute towards the cost of production of the collective 
good. We assume in section 4 that this problem of collective action is easier to resolve where there is highly 
centralised sectoral collective bargaining than in the case of highly decentralised collective bargaining (see 
hypothesis 2). This hypothesis is confirmed in table 2, which shows the correlation coefficients between the 
indicator for the degree of centralisation and 'employment in the collective agreement'16. It has emerged that 
there is a strong and significant correlation between the two variables. The link becomes even stronger if we 
check the level of organisation of employers and employees. We did this because the analysis in section 6.3 
will show not only the dominant level of negotiation but also the importance of the variables in relation to the 
strength of the interest organisations.  
 
Table 2 Centralisation of collective bargaining and employment measures in the collective 
agreement (Pearson correlation) 
Institutional characteristics Employment in the collective 
agreement 
degree of centralisation of collective bargaining 
 
.51** 
checked for the level of organisation of employers  
 
.64** 
checked for the level of organisation of employees 
 
.58** 
* level of significance p<.05 
** level of significance p<.01 
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 For further explanation of this indicator and the method of calculation we refer to Van Ruysseveldt (2000), pp. 240-241. 
The same picture emerges if we classify the JCs on the basis of a typology of bargaining systems (see 
Van Ruysseveldt, 2000, pp. 241-246): here a distinction is made between centralised, decentralised and 
multilevel types of negotiating system. In the multilevel type the most substantial agreements on the most 
important employment conditions are made at the sectoral level, but additional decentralised negotiations also 
take place. In a covariance analysis with 'type of bargaining system' as the independent variable and 'level of 
organisation of employers', 'level of organisation of employees', 'evolution of employment 1992-1997' and 
'average company size' as covariates, the results were as follows: it was measured that the 'bargaining system' 
variable has a significant main effect on the dependent variable 'employment measures in the collective 
agreement': F(2.30) = 3.99 (p<.05). The multiple comparison test reveals that JCs with highly centralised 
collective bargaining score significantly higher on average for this dependent variable than JCs with highly 
decentralised collective bargaining. 
 
6.3 Level of organisation and employment in the collective agreement 
It is often said that industrial consultation between the social partners is characterised by a narrow corporatistic 
reflex. The self-interest of the social partners and the collective interests of the actors within a particular sector 
or a particular enterprise are said to take precedence over the public interest. The finger is pointed at the trade 
unions in particular: they are said to be highly focused on protecting the interests of so-called 'insiders', namely 
the workers. No attention is paid to the problems of 'outsiders', i.e. non-working people or those working in 
other types of employment. On the basis of such an assumption, a negative correlation should be assumed 
between the power of the trade union federations in the JC and the attention paid in the collective agreement to 
measures to promote employment. 
 The opposite assumption can also be formulated: it is precisely the trade union federations that have 
an interest in contributing towards pushing down high levels of unemployment. Trade union federations - and 
not the employer federations involved - will take the lead in promoting employment. As trade union 
federations have more power they will be more successful at ensuring that a lot of measures to promote 
employment are included in the collective agreement. On the basis of such an assumption, a positive 
correlation ought to be found between the power of the trade union federations and 'employment in the 
collective agreement'.  
 
Level of organisation of employees 
The correlation coefficients in table 3 show that there is a strong positive correlation between the level of 
organisation of employees and the variable 'employment in the collective agreement'. When a check is carried 
out on the 'degree of centralisation of collective bargaining' and 'the level of organisation of employers' there is 
also a strong positive correlation. It can be deduced from this that more attention is paid to employment in the 
collective agreement the stronger the trade union federations or the more members they have.  
 The results of the covariance analysis also indicate a strong positive correlation between the level of 
organisation of employees' and 'employment in the collective agreement'. A covariance analysis was carried 
out with the following covariates: 'evolution of employment 1992-1997', 'average company size' and 'degree of 
centralisation of collective bargaining' and 'level of organisation of employers'. It was found that 'level of 
organisation of employees' had a significant main effect on the dependent variable 'employment measures in 
the collective agreement': F(2.30) = 5.05 (p<.05). The multiple comparison test revealed that the average score 
for the dependent variable in the group of JCs with trade union federations organising less than 50% of 
employees differed significantly from the group of JCs with trade union federations organising more than 75% 
of employees. 
 
Table 3 Level of organisation of employees and employment measures in the collective 
agreement (Pearson correlation) 
 employment 
in the collective agreement 
level of organisation of employees 
 
.51** 
checked for the degree of centralisation of collective bargaining 
 
.57** 
checked for the level of organisation on the employer side 
 
.50** 
** level of significance p<.01 
 
Level of organisation of employers 
Table 4 shows the correlation coefficients between the level of organisation of employers and the dependent 
variable. We can observe that there is no significant link between the level of organisation of employers and 
employment in the collective agreement. Based on the assumption that it is not the employer organisations but 
rather the trade unions that take the lead in introducing measures to promote employment in the collective 
agreement, it is not surprising that we do not find any direct positive correlation. (Co)variance analyses with 
'level of organisation of employers' as an independent variable also show that there is no significant main effect 
on 'employment in the collective agreement'. If, however, we check for the degree of centralisation of 
collective bargaining, a strong and significant correlation does appear. This points to a possible interaction 
effect. 
 
Table 4 Level of organisation of employers and employment measures in the collective 
agreement (Pearson correlation) 
 employment 
in the collective agreement 
level of organisation of employers 
 
.12 
checked for the degree of centralisation of collective bargaining 
 
.46** 
checked for the level of organisation on the employee side 
 
-.02 
* level of significance p<.05 
** level of significance p<.01 
 A covariance analysis was therefore carried out with the interaction between 'level of organisation of 
employers' and 'degree of centralisation of collective bargaining' as independent variables and 'evolution of 
employment 1992-1997', 'average company size' and 'level of organisation of employees' as covariates. It was 
found in this covariance analysis that 'level of organisation of employers' and 'degree of centralisation' have a 
significant interaction effect on the dependent variable 'employment measures in the collective agreement' 
variant 1': F(2.31) = 8.63 (p<.01). 
 
Table 5  Type of bargaining system, level of organisation of employers  
and employment in the collective agreement: averages (standard deviations) 
 employment measures in the collective 
agreement 
Multilevel bargaining systems Average 
(std dev) 
 
Sub-group 1: (N= 7) 
Level of organisation of employers is higher than 85% 
 
 
3.23 
(1.56) 
 
Centralised bargaining systems   
Sub-group 2: (N= 16) 
Level of organisation of employers is lower than 85% 
 
 
2.65 
(1.25) 
 
Sub-group 3: (N= 4) 
Level of organisation of employers is higher than 85% 
 
 
3.13 
(0.69) 
 
Decentralised bargaining systems   
Sub-group 4: (N= 3) 
Level of organisation of employers is lower than 85% 
 
 
1.76 
(0.77) 
 
Sub-group 5: (N= 7) 
Level of organisation of employers is higher than 85% 
 
 
1.89 
(1.11) 
 
total 
(N=37) 
2.60 
(1.26) 
 
 
In table 5 this interaction effect is analysed in more detail. The JCs were subdivided into two groups on the 
basis of the level of organisation of employers (lower and higher than 85%), with the median for 'level of 
organisation of employers' being used as a dividing line. This sudivision is then superimposed over our 
typology of bargaining systems. In this way five sub-groups emerge. In JCs with a multilevel type of 
bargaining system, the employer federations are always strongly organised so that a distinction cannot be made 
on the basis of 'level of organisation of employers'. In the table the average scores for the dependent variable 
are calculated for these five sub-groups. The average scores are highest where a level of organisation of 
employers coincides with a sectoral collective agreement with substantial content, i.e. in sub-groups 1 and 3. 
Where collective bargaining is decentralised, it makes no difference whether the level of organisation in the 
employer federations is low or high: the average scores for sub-groups 4 and 5 for the dependent variable are 
very close together. Sub-group 2 occupies an intermediate position: in these JCs negotiations take place 
centrally but the level of organisation of the employer federations is low and this pushes down the average 
score in comparison with the JCs with central bargaining and highly organised employer federations. These 
results run in parallel with the findings from other analyses (see Van Ruysseveldt, 2000, pp. 276-279): a high 
level of centralisation of collective bargaining is a necessary precondition for many measures to promote 
employment in the collective agreement, but the level of organisation of the interest organisations also plays a 
part. We will come back to this in the concluding section. 
 
6.4 Socio-economic environmental characteristics  
Is there a direct correlation between certain socio-economic characteristics of the sectors for which the JCs 
engage in bargaining and the results of collective bargaining? More specifically we study whether there is a 
correlation with the evolution of employment in the sector in question, the level of competition in the sector 
and market orientation (hypotheses 6, 7 and 8 from section 4). 
Table 6 shows the correlation coefficients between the dependent variable and two of the selected 
environmental characteristics: the evolution of employment in the sector in question and the level of 
competition in the sector. It emerges that none of the correlation coefficients reached a sufficient level of 
significance (p<.05)17. Hypotheses 618 and 7 can therefore be rejected. 
 
Table 6 Environmental characteristics and employment measures in the collective 
agreement  
Environmental characteristics  employment  
in the collective agreement 
difference in jobs 1992-1997 (in %)1 
 
.12 
checked for company size 
(% employees in companies with more than 100 employees)1 
 
.12 
average annual change in employment 1992-1997 (in %)1 
 
.14 
checked for company size 
(% employees in companies with more than 100 employees)1 
 
.14 
level of competition (general)² 
 
-.07 
level of competition on the basis of pay and flexibility of labour² 
 
.01 
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 The correlation coefficients that were calculated between the dependent variable and a number of other environmental 
characteristics, such as the nature of the sector (industry, services) and the structure of the sector are not significant. It can be deduced 
from these findings that there is no direct correlation between the separate environmental characteristics and the dependent variable 
'employment in the collective agreement'. A strictly deterministic explanatory model must therefore be rejected. 
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 A variance analysis showed that the 'general level of competition', 'level of competition on the basis of pay and flexibility of labour' 
and 'level of competition on the basis of quality and innovation' have no significant effect on 'employment in the collective agreement'. 
Even if a covariance analysis is carried out with 'evolution of employment' and 'average company size' as covariates, there is still no 
significant correlation. 
level of competition on the basis of quality oand innovation² 
 
-.17 
1 Pearson correlation 
² Kendall’s tau 
* level of significance p<.05 
** level of significance p<.01 
 
The situation is quite different with the variable 'market orientation' (hypothesis 8). In this case JCs are 
classified on the basis of whether the companies in the sector in question produce mainly for the international 
market or mainly for the domestic market. A t-test with 'market orientation' as an independent variable and 
'employment in the collective agreement' as a dependent variable therefore showed a significant effect (t = -
2.46; df = 35; p<.05). A covariance analysis was then carried out with 'evolution of employment' and 'average 
company size' as covariates. The measurements showed that the variable 'market orientation' has a significant 
main effect on the dependent variable 'employment measures in the collective agreement'’: F(1.33) = 5.78 
(p<.05). JCs in sectors producing for the domestic market score significantly higher on average for the variable 
'employment in the collective agreement' than JCs in sectors producing for the international market. The 
question is whether the power of the trade union federations in the JC changes anything here or - in view of the 
market orientation of the sector - the power of the trade union federations no longer makes much difference. In 
other words: are well-organised trade union federations able to act against the dictates of international 
competition, or is an inevitable decrease in industrial consultation taking place as a result of international 
competition? 
 A covariance analysis was carried out with 'market orientation', 'evolution of employment 1992-1997', 
'average company size', 'degree of centralisation of collective bargaining', 'level of organisation of employees' 
and 'level of organisation of employers' as independent variables and 'employment in the collective agreement' 
as a dependent variable. This covariance analysis gave rise to the following results: 
1. 'Evolution of employment 1992-1997', 'average company size' and 'level of organisation of employers' 
have no significant main effect on 'employment in the collective agreement', but the other three 
independent variables do have such an effect. 
2. It was measured that there is a significant main effect exerted by the independent variables 'level of 
organisation of employees': F(1.30) = 16.65 (p<.01); 'degree of centralisation of collective bargaining': 
F(1.30) = 10.79 (p<.01) and 'market orientation': F(1.30) = 4.29 (p<.05). 
In summary, a higher level of organisation of employees, a higher level of centralisation of collective 
bargaining and production for the domestic market are associated with more measuures to promote 
employment in the collective agreement. The variables in the covariance analysis jointly account for 66% of 
the total variance in 'employment in the collective agreement'. 
 The level of organisation of employees and the market orientation of the sector have an influence on 
'employment in the collective agreement'. The influence of the level of organisation of employees is mainly felt 
in sectors that produce mainly for the domestic market. In sectors that produce mainly for the international 
market, the level of organisation of employees does play a part, but the correlation with 'employment in the 
collective agreement' is less strong. For JCs in sectors producing mainly for the domestic market, the Pearson 
correlation coefficient between 'the level of organisation of employees' and 'employment in the collective 
agreement' is .80 (p<.01); for JCs in sectors producing mainly for the international market, the Pearson 
correlation coefficient is 'only' .46 (p<.05). 
 
6.5 Employment in the collective agreement: multiple regression analysis
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At the end of our analyses we also carried out a multiple regression analysis. This analysis technique makes it 
possible, among other things, to measure the extent to which the various independent variables are able - 
individually and/or collectively - to account for the variation in the dependent variable and to ascertain which 
independent variable is most important in accounting for the dependent variable. We are mainly interested in this 
last application: we want to know how strong the correlation is between the various independent variables in the 
model and the dependent variable20.  
The method of multiple regression analysis used is the 'stepwise' method (inclusion criterion p<.05 and 
removal criterion p<.10). The independent variables which are introduced are the various characteristics of JCs 
which are included in the extended research model: 
 environmental characteristics: evolution of employment 1992-1997, percentage of employees in companies 
with more than 100 employees, market orientation (dummy), competition in the market (dummy), status of 
the JC (dummy), nature of the sector (dummy) 
 preferences of negotiators involved in collective bargaining: preference of ACV negotiator in relation to 
employment 
 institutional characteristics: degree of centralisation of collective bargaining, percentage of employees 
covered by a company collective agreement 
 organisational characteristics on the employer side: level of organisation of employers, number of employer 
federations and level of concentration of employers 
 organisational characteristics on the employee side: level of organisation of employees, number of trade 
union federations, level of concentration of employees, level of competition between trade union federations 
and perceived degree of co-operation between trade union federations 
 interaction effects : two interaction effects have been introduced which are highlighted in the covariance 
analyses: ‘evolution of employment 1992-1997 x percentage of employees in companies with more than 100 
employees' and 'level of organisation of employers x degree of centralisation of collective bargaining'21.  
A total of nineteen independent variables were therefore introduced into the analysis. The results of the 
stepwise multiple regression analysis are summarised in table 7. 
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 Our thanks to Jerry Welkenhuyzen for his expert and effective assistance in carrying out the regression analysis. 
20
 It must also be pointed out that regression analysis is aimed at prediction rather than causality: whether or not the independent 
variables whose scores make it possible to predict the score for the dependent variable are also causally related to that dependent 
variable is not determined by this method, but on the basis of theory and interpretation by the researchers. 
Table 7 Stepwise multiple regression analysis (N = 37), prediction of employment in the 
collective agreement 
 
Step Variable R R2 R2-change p<  
1. 
 
Level of organisation of employers x  
degree of centralisation (interaction) 
 
 
.63 
 
.40 
 
.40 
 
.001 
 
.35 
2. Level of organisation of employees .76 .58 .18 .001 .54 
3. Market orientation .83 .69 .11 .001 .36 
4. Preferences of ACV trade union federation in 
relation to employment  
.88 .78 .09 .001 .32 
 
Four variables jointly account for 78% of the total variance in the dependent variable 'employment in the 
collective agreement'. The interaction effect  between 'degree of centralisation of collective bargaining' and the 
level of organisation of employers' accounts for 40% of the total variance in the dependent variable. The 'level 
of organisation of employees' contributes a further 18% to the explanation of the total variance in the 
dependent variable and 'market orientation’' and 'preferences of ACV trade union federations in relation to 
employment' contribute a further 11 and 9% respectively (see R2-change, table 7). If we look at the strength of 
the correlation between the four independent variables and the dependent variable, we observe that the 'level of 
organisation of employees' makes the greatest contribution towards predicting the value of the dependent 
variable ( = .54), while the other three independent variables have approximately the same strength of 
correlation with the dependent variable (see -scores, table 7).  
 
7. Conclusions 
 
The various analyses that have been carried out on the database of 37 selected JCs always reveal the same 
picture: the results of collective bargaining are linked to institutional, organisational and socio-economic 
characteristics of JCs which can be clearly described and measured and also to the preferences of negotiators 
involved in collective bargaining. First of all a correlation has been observed between the preferences of ACV 
negotiators and the presence of employment measures in the collective agreement. Preferences do not, 
however, account for everything. Specific characteristics such as the dominant level of negotiation (which 
interacts with the level of organisation on the employer side) and the level of organisation on the employee 
side (as a measure of the power of the trade union federations) are also important: as collective bargaining 
takes on more of a centralised character (i.e. the substantial agreements on employment conditions are made at 
                                                                                                                                                                     
21
 The third interaction effect that emerged from the covariance analyses, 'level of organisation of employees x preference of ACV 
trade union federation in relation to employment' was not introduced because of a problem of multicolinearity. The two variables were 
introduced separately into the analysis. 
the sectoral level) and as trade union federations are more strongly organised, more measures are negotiated in 
the collective agreement to promote employment.  
It can be deduced from our results that more effort is made on employment in the collective agreement 
the stronger the trade union federations or the more members they have. It seems that the 'pessimistic' view of 
social partners or trade unions acting on a narrowly corporatist basis can be rejected. Clearly the social partners 
are not only focused on their own strict self-interest or the interests of their members (the 'insiders'), but under 
certain conditions they take into account the consequences of their actions or negotiations on the wider society 
and they are willing to contribute towards the resolution of social problems. Our research allows us to specify 
these conditions in more detail. More specifically a certain degree of centralisation of collective bargaining is a 
sine qua non for a social orientation on the part of the social partners and a degree of macro-responsiveness in 
collective bargaining. From the policy perspective it can be concluded from this that greater decentralisation of 
collective bargaining will not particularly promote a sense of social responsibility among the social partners.  
Substantial collective bargaining at the sectoral level, however, does not constitute a sufficient 
condition for a social orientation on the part of the social partners: the level of organisation of the social 
partners is also important. A high level of macro-responsiveness in the collective agreement is mainly achieved 
in those JCs where a high level of centralisation in collective bargaining coincides with strong interest 
organisations (see table 8; see also Van Ruysseveldt (2000), pp. 322-324). 
 
Table 8 Bargaining regime and macro-responsiveness of the collective agreement  
 
 Strength of interest organisations 
dominant level of negotiation strong weak 
centralised macro-responsiveness = 
high 
 
macro-responsiveness = 
moderate to low 
 
decentralised macro-responsiveness =  
moderate to low 
 
macro-responsiveness =  
low 
 
 
Finally our analyses also show that there is no direct causal link between environmental characteristics and the 
dependent variable. Institutional and organisational factors are always at stake. The results of the multiple 
regression analysis give the clearest results in this connection: only a single environmental characteristic - 
market orientation – is a significant predictor of differences in the macro-responsiveness of collective 
agreements. Other institutional and organisational characteristics such as the degree of centralisation of the 
collective bargaining process and the level of organisation on the employee side, however, play a greater or at 
least equal part in predicting the value of the dependent variable. This does not, however, mean that 
environmental characteristics have no influence on the progress and results of collective bargaining. Those 
environmental characteristics are not, however, decisive. They do not determine the results of the negotiations.  
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